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from "Don't Try: 
Civil Jury Verdicts 
in a System Geared to 
Settlement," appearing 
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designed a system of civil justice that 
embodies and expresses that preference 
in everythmg from the rules of procedure 
and evidence, to appellate opinions, to 
legal scholarship, to the daily work of our 
trial judges. Our culture portrays trial - 
especially trial by jury - as the 
quintessential dramatic instrument of 
justice. Our judicial system operates on a 
different premise: that trial is a disease - 
not generally fatal, but serious enough to 
be avoided at any reasonable cost. 
Preference for settlement is not unique 
to the American legal system but it is 
especially pervasive and strong, for 
several reasons. We have many lawyers, 
by any count, but few judges. As a result, 
we have very many litigated disputes per 
judge - so it is essential that most cases 
be resolved without judgment. This 
scarcity of judges is possible because of 
our adversary system of adjudication. In 
this system the parties control the 
development and presentation of facts; 
the fact finder (judge or jury) is passive, 
and has a comparatively small role in the 
process. Party control of evidence makes 
private settlement easier, since the parties - themselves, rather than the court, procure 
the information they need to negotiate. 
Adversary fact finding is also expensive, 
unpredictable (especially if the ultimate 
tribunal is a jury), and, given our scarcity 
of judges, slow. As a result, the savings to - - -  
be reahzed by settlement - in time, 
money and Ask - are greater than they 
might be in a quicker, cheaper and more 
predictable system. These explanations, of 
course, are not independent of each 
other. On the contrary, the major 
structural reasons for the special 
importance of settlement in American 
litigation - scarcity of judges and 
J 
abundance of lawyers, adversarial fact 
finding, trial by jury - are all 
manifestations of a single cultural value: 
the preference for private ordering over 
public control. 
Trials, of course, are important beyond 
their numbers. For the public, trials have 
the advantage of visibility They are open 
and dramatic whle settlements are 
usually boring and private - in fact, 
invisible. Their openness also makes trials 
attractive subjects for study by scholars, 
with the added benefit that cases that are 
fought to the end are likely to present 
1 
j If it is true, as we often hear, that we are one of the most Iiigbus 
'i 
societies on earth, it is because of our propensky to sue. I 
not our affinity tor trials. Of the hundreds of thousands of civil 
h~wsuits that are Med each year in Ameriea, the great majority 
;+'--h%$T$>=q 52, *>?;,.<t;g-f-f.:y.. ue re@,ed; of those that ,&&5 $ & F $ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  &$+a'@& "Itim 
I 
\ dismissed by the plaintiffs or by the courts; only a few percent 
are tried to a jury or a judge. 
-- more of the issues that we like-to study 
PHOTOS BY THOMAS TREUTER 
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This is no accident. 
and need to teach. But for practitioners 
trials are important primarily because 
they influence the terms of settlement for 
the mass of cases that are not tried - 
because they cast a major part of the legal 
shadow within which private bargaining 
takes place. Tiials have this standard-setting 
effect despite the fact that they are not 
typical of the cases in whlch their results 
are used as guides for settlement. 
Scholars are unanimous in r ecop ing  
that trials are not representative of the 
mass of litigated disputes. They seem to 
be selected because of unusual rather 
than common features, such as high 
stakes, extreme uncertainty about the 
outcome, and reputational stakes of the 
parties. Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants 
(1994) is an extreme case, but a useful 
example nonetheless. 
On Feb, 27, 1992, Mrs. Stella Liebeck, 
aged 79, a passenger in a car driven by 
her grandson, bought a cup of coffee at a 
take-out window of a McDonald's in 
Albuquerque. With the car stopped, she 
held the styrofoam cup between her legs, 
tried to pry off the top, and spilled the 
coffee - whch was scaldmg hot. She 
suffered third degree bums. She sued, 
and three years later a jury returned a 
verdict against the McDonald's Corporation 
for $160,000 in compensatory damages 
and $2.7 million in punitive damages. 
The verdct became an instant cliche in 
the tort reform debate. At first, it was the 
ultimate jury-trial horror story: Woman 
gets $2.86 Mihon For Spilling Her 
Coffee. Later, it re-emerged as a tale of 
justice done: Mrs. Liebeck was severely 
injured - she was hospitalized for eight 
days and required s h  grafts; she was 
injured because of McDonaldb policy of 
serving coffee 15 to 20 degrees hotter 
than its competitors; McDonald's knew 
the danger of sellmg coffee at that heat - 
it had received 700 prior complaints in 
the previous five years, some involving 
serious bums - but it never considered 
changmg its practice; the $2.7 million 
When dvil disputes end in trial 
there is almost always a clear loser, and usually a clear winner as well. 
its *c , 
M& 0 s q  ~ebkkc x 1Mc-0 
w~ssauwthlnis~~he,-yltm 
un* and the facts of the daim 
wen? l $ l l G o y l  to say tbe Eenst.' In 
many @tqecO1 howmet, it is a perfectly 
np-iyp example of en American 
dviljuaytrid-asGshJlye. 
Tp lr-d m1 tx& in America it 
is n e d r y  to m&&r them in the 
context d the p r e d  bargaining in 
whi& d d  &ti@ipn is usually molved 
That is w k w g  attempt &-&is utide, 
usQ'kv~sam~ks of dd jury trbh in 
Gallfor@% z4ate mmt5, one horn 1985- 
1986, zpd one b m  1990-1991. Both 
stamp&, were draws from case reports 
in Jwy ,I& Mekly, a state-wide 
Calif~r& jury verdict repmter that is 
widely used by lnwyen in eduatmg their 
cases - in o k  wonk, our data were 
generated by one of the iwtnxments 
t&& which tlinls cast their shadows 
over ietrkmmt negotiations. For the 
second sample, we aLvJ interviewed 735 
attorneys who represented a plaintiff or 
defendant ia one of the cases, and asked 
them ahout insurance coveragea fee 
armqpmen~v the parties' pre-trial 
bargpining positions, and the k a o ~  that 
drmtheheepsesto.ThiSnwey 
provides unique data. , 
For this nrtide, we ammMed a 
statistid p o w  01 the civil jury-trial 
caselard of the California State Superior 
Courts, the stare murts bf .~eaeral 
ju-don. Bljefl~ we find that most 
civil jury rrinls in C&f.omh (over 70%) 
concern pemw1 injury clPims of one 
sort ar another; that h o s t  dl plaintiff& 
in triaJ~ of wry sort, slre individuals; that 
the awhej- +o* of thes 
plainti& (epwidy in personal injury 
cases) pay their attorneys on P contingent 
basis; md that almost all defendants, 
except-some hrge busmesss and 
gmemmat entitits, bqw imwqpx thpl 
c o v w h c m f o f d e ~ g t b c l a d t  
andallorsa~aftbeporentialdamages. 
T h e t y p i c d d d j u r y ~ l i a p a s a d  
injury claim by an indiyiduEll sgainn a 
large a m p w ,  in which wither party is 
playing with its own money: the plaintiff 
i s q ~ n t e d ~ a n a t m m e y a f i o s e k  
ande*penuswillbepidmofk - 
movezy Ofony), d the &he€ has 
m inrmmw p0ll.q that mvers dl 
defase CQW d any &ek j u d g m a  
~ e c h v . ~ ~ & d ~ c z i t e r i a ,  
except that the &fen* any well have 
been d insured. 
Thrse mxable o u w m  emerge frmn 
the outcom of these t d s :  
First, ~ 8 6 t  Of the total sumof money 
a d e d  in these trials is concentratied in 
a s d n u m b e r o f v e r y l n r g e ~  
Second, the pattern of out- in 
personal injury trids is very Merent 
from that in commerial trials. Plainti& 
lose most pemnal injury trials - that is, 
they do less wd. at trial than they would 
have by set* - while defendaats are 
more likely to lose in c o d  trials. 
On average, pe~onal injmry vedicts are 
roughly midway between what @e 
plain& demand and what the 
defendants offer in settlement; on 
average, c o d  vedcts are 
considerably larger than the plain@ 
demands as well as the defendantss" offers. 
Third, jury m I t s  ue r d y  
compmmisg. Compromise, of course, is 
the essence of settlemmt, but 
eompmmise judgments iue also possible 
at trial. In fact, they hardly h a p p  
When civil disputes end in trial ihen is 
almost always a clear loser, and usually a 
clear wimer as well. 
Here, we examine the role of trial in 
American civil litigation, aria consider 
possible reforms. The key question is: 
Why ate compromise verdicts so 
d b - ,  
- - I  ; 
8 .  - - . .. "1. . 
u ~ o ~ o n ?  We offer a structud 
q h e i o n :  This is a n a d  
consequence of a legal system in pmich 
set-t and trial arr mut* 
mlwive rather tban c o m p h ~  
methods of dqmte resotution, and it is 
exacerbated byilk hgh cost of aials. 
Veryfavcvesgotouial,mdthQsethat 
do are atyplcdy &ficult disputes chat 
could not be rompromised by the parties 
and are nor W y  so produce cornprombe 
verdicts. Once a@, Liebeck u Md)offalds 
is a good ill-tion. The defendant 
passed up many opportunities to set&. 
stvting with a $2,000 d e d  by the 
p W  before she filed the complaint, 
and en@ with a $225,000 
~ummendra~on h m  a mediatar. At 
trial, the issue was k d  in dl-m- 
nothang terms: The Case of the m&!ss 
Customer vs. The Case of the Callous 
Corpmtion, The verdict was much larger 
than my propod s~ttkrnent, brtt 
judging from public response it could just 
as easily have been zem. 
Theuialsweseearetheproductsofa 
procedural system that is devouring itself. 
As we have refined and elaborated the 
rules for jury trials we have multiplied 
the c+ of uial both to the pdes and to 
the COW. The costs to the paIties drive 
them to skip all these expensive 
procedures and settle; the costs to the 
system drive judgs and rulemake= to 
h d  new wnys to encourage them to do 
so. hreasingly~ the cases that litigants 
insist an trying are not only mre bur 
peculiar- In a sense, the Liebeck h l  was 
common even in its peculi&ties. Et is 
mi shd i i  to hold up Liebeck as a typical 
example of.American litigption: car 
accidents and medical procedures must 
generate a th~usand hvsuits for every 
coffee-bum case, and punitive damage 
awards in any amount am rare in 
pemnal injury trials. But trials are never 
typical. Odmay mses of every son are 
compromised and settle, and those that 
don't are unusual even if the context is a 
garden-variety two-car crash. Trials are - 

t h  such verdicts am EUT suggests &at 
damages is not often the mdn isswe at 
is a dlid~~to-mopus 
- tiability is at hiue a tciel csa only be 
~ v d e d i h t h e p r d e s a g p e m a  
Lh;rrnd@~.ethPt-theaecuel 
is a failure. This view of trials is related to darnages multiplied by some estimate of 
their m c a m  .in two ways. Eizst, as a the lil;tel&OOd that a jury will find the 
cause: The kccurate) belief that trislls are defendant hble. &-trial baqpining will 
expensive and risky is a-p%wrfj,l reflect this logic. The plaintiff will not ask 
incentive ~a set& those case5 that can be for more than the known damages, 
settled -<%Q corn- whenever although in an,wreme case she may 
compmmise is possible, and to avoid aial d e d  no less, while the defendant will 
at all ccws when the stakes ate too small offer some fraction of the d loss, or 
for either side to come out ahead. That nothing at all. I£ the case does go to tnal 
leaves 2 reddue of all-or-notlung, caxs the jury is likely to side with the 
that h e e d  compromise before trial and defendant md to give the plaintdl 
are likely to pmduce all-or-nothmg no-, or to side with the pktiff  and 
verdim after trial. Second, as a give her as much as or mom than she 
consequence: The kct rhat trials usually demanded in settlement. And indeed, one 
are q a i v e  winner-~h-d affairs or the other of these outcames ~~d 
remforccs the CON- h t  they are in about 77% of our cases. In oPher 
dangerous and to be shamed. , words, uials over liability will produce 
And *hat are these stubborn, the all-or-nathg battles that we mostly 
u n c o a p m g  cases that end in trial? see - cases in which one side always 
Ju- b m  our data, fhey axe primarily loses, and the other side h o s t  always 
disputes over li&Xty rather than wins. 
~ a m q p i .  hpa~rchatisi32hemtinthe 
natwaf the hum lkmagm isba 
continuou~ variable, a d  -thegfore more 
susceprj,bI:e ta compromise and 
settlemmnt. &L addition, 8 &mqp were 
the maim issue in conmti~n at most trials 
we wwkd expect to see more 
Why do we have trlel at  aM 
&llf&ii*the~osf&rid;the 
@mzstizg q m a  about Amaicaa 
lil&&an knat there;ue so few 
txik&Y,a*w % w e a s ~ y m w e  
dolo. The o w  problem is mwum: 
~ m i r  cpn litigmj n&@ to go to Wid? 
T h e ~ i g t h a f t h e w s t s d l i s k s a ~  
ag,gmgad a m =  mcmg mes, though 
:&*hw*a,f-ntk 
angl lialnlitp inmame. h s t  all 
pleotiffs in our crises are indid&, and 
nemly Wof&*nts coe in&- 
0rdbusincsses.Suchp-,mW 
owa, mdd m 1 y  muster the hnds or rhe 
nave to conduct i x  superior Court aial. 
 he piaim& mIh d e  or dismiss; the 
defendants wodd settle or &huk k t  a ' 
plaintiif wirh a cmthgmt-fee attorney or 
a defendant with an insurance company 
can afford to go ahead, even to €rid. As a 
result, p h &  attorneys and Uility 
insurers play a major role in determining 
who has access to court. In most cases, a 
plaintiff who cant get a contmgency fee 
lawyer pmbably won't he able to sue; one 
reason plaint&' attorneys may decline to 
take a case on: a contingency is'ht the 
defendant is uninsured - which means 
that, except for large institutions, 
u-d defendants are unlikely to be 
sued, and if they are sued, they are 
unlikely to be able to defend &.~MS&RS 
through trial. 
But conmgem fees and insumce only 
make ui$s possible. They do not explain 
why civil trials actually occur, or tell us 
what functions tnals serve (if any) in a 
system in which 98% of disputes are 
resolved by setdement. The possible 
expexphatiions fall into three catep* 
guidance for settlement, strategic 
barsning and strategic intmqpe, 
and non-economic interests. 
1. C u k e  for Satleimen& Every 
theory of pre-uial bargaining assumes 
that a negotiated settlement is 
thing battles we mostly see - 
~ * ~ ~ ~ ~ W *  ::GK Y : ~ W  g&dfw3*-& a 
determined, at l&t in part, by the 
parties' predctions of the outcome of the 
case if it did go to trial. Needless to say 
such predictions are uncertain, and that 
uncertainty may affect the terms of a 
settlement. For example, a risk-averse 
plaintiff may accept less than the 
expected value of her claim because she 
is unwilling to take the chance of an 
unlikely but possible defense verdict. But 
there must be some common basis, 
however shaky, for assessing the 
consequences of a failure to settle. If trials 
became vanishingly rare lawyers and 
litigants would make increasingly crude 
predictions of trial verdicts. As a result 
there would be more cases in whch their 
ill-informed guesses would be too far 
apart to compromise; which would lead 
to more trials, more verdicts, and better 
information on trial outcomes; which in 
turn would produce more settlements, 
and reduce or stabilize the trial rate. For 
all we know, the few trials that now occur 
are pretty close to the minimum number 
our settlementdominated system 
requires. 
2. Strategk Bargaining and Stmtegic 
Intransigence. In litigation, as in other 
adversarial contexts, many of the moves 
in negotiation are "strategicn - ploys that 
are used to mislead and manipulate. - 
Thus litigants will conceal or distort 
information to impress their opponents, 
demand things that they don't want to get 
other concessions that they do, and play 
chcken with the opposition in order to 
get paid to avoid trials that nobody 
wants. When strategic bargaining works 
it improves the terms of settlement - 
you may get an additional $20,000 out of 
a defendant by convincing him that 
otherwise you'll go to trial even if it costs 
you $100,000 - but if he calls your bluff 
the result may be no settlement at all. 
Our data show clear signs of this sort , 
of strategic bargaining. For example, most 
defendants in our commercial trials made 
puny settlement offers and then got 
hammered in court. In 1985-86 the offers 
in commercial trials averaged $574,000 
less than the verdicts and the defendants 
lost 67% of the trials; in 1990-91 they 
averaged $1,710,000 less and the 
defendants lost 55% of the time. - 
I M I I I ~ ~ ~ B  r IWW & . & ~ I E  c c a n ~ m i ~ ,  
S e ~ f o r ~ ~ Z b & ~ ~ ; n q . .  . .  
dffer mom set& i$wmarl oflW?. 3n 
m a  b&*d t2iiwE5, d-, hat ' 
must be me, but -mendl we: &ink .not. 
For the mom paa the plaint@@ these ,- 
c i i S r s ~ l a * a 1 q a i t h t h p ~ a & '  
'made puny deqamb - an amrage - 
9322,000 Lss thw rhe vdihts & 1m5- 
86 and $710,006 1m in 1~90-91- h' 
conwt . to  pmom1 iaguq gbtiff~~ ' 
who demanded on m p l e -  a mat &&la 
more tbnn rhe jurles them. Ifr$a, 
ccxnmercial plain& wha ultipmteJ,y wait 
,to Fol were willing t~ settle fa  tho^^, 
hwe wko did salg m y  h e  iqpx&~ 
rake an wen&h~~iwdhjq 
d w  of .their claims. Whyl The ,ga' 
majo* af k e  e m M J  plaiatif& 412. 
individuals, 4- p m d  ' i m j l ~ y  
phZlih3 most od ~ I m ~ ~ Z $ a y  so* sr 
all oftha costs ofmk we a tlrird pay 
their llwyns at lcaa pa* by rhe how, 
and two t.hird~ advance at 1-t a podan 
of b mid 'eqxnes. V&iy k l y  mmx df 
thee plabtifkts w m  rel~iernt -or urn& 
to invest money 'in li-ri@,w, eveh'in. \. 
ases in which one Ie alwayr loses, i I the othe~ llmost al rapd 
..ti*<. u 
The mmt common repeat pkyen in however, pve the insurance company the winningcases - and b e  defendants can 
take admtage of their timidity by 
sticlung to lav-ball offers 'fhat strategy, 
howewr, r e q u k  the defendant to 
maintain a posture of intransigence: Take 
$20,0@0 or go to trial. This may be the 
best appach, and it may w6rk 95% of 
the time, but when it fails the result 
probably won't be a settlement for 
$ ~OO$OO but an expensive trial followed 
by an even larger verdict. 
When a party to a bpute  is a repeat 
player - a person or an institution that 
participates in a steady stream of litigated 
cases - it has an iadditioml incentive to 
behave smtegimlly: to innuence *he 
outcomes of other cases. For example, a 
newspaper may refuse to ever settle a w  
defamation Claim, regardless of the merits 
or the cost, in order to discourage libel 
suits by building a reputation as a 
stubborn and expensive opponent. On 
the other hand, a manufacturermay 
quietly settle a products liability case in 
order to avoid a public .trial that could 
produce o dangerous precedent if the 
c id  Iiugartiion for rnoneGry d A & p  am 
not parties themselves but agents of the 
parties - plaintiff& azt-tomeys and 
ir-mmn. wItpmkS. Thismtes ehe 
possibility of cmilicts of intenst. On the 
plaintifR side, the attorney m y  want to 
go to nial to esublish h e d  winner, 
or at least as someone who will fight to 
the expensive end. Such a mputatian 
rmght bring in business, it lmght even 
help future clients, but it has no value to 
the current- me-sht =plaint-&. On ihe 
defense side, the mosr c o n m o ~  pomtid 
codk t  ocars in .cases with doubtfd.: A - - 
liability and. damages m excess of the .:is 
liability lmit ~f the dekndantS h m ' 1 ~ e e  
policy If the plaintiff makes a demand at 
or near ithe policy limit, the d e b t  
will probably want to take the settlement, 
whirzh is h e  to him, mther than rblc a 
trial after which he might he stuck with 
personal liability for damages above that 
limit. Most liability insurance contracts, 
power to accept or reject settlemnts, and 
the insurance company may pder a trial: 
It cant lose more than the policy limit 
one way or the other, and, for the price of 
trying the case, it might save itself a 
setdement of about that arnouqt.. 
W e  h n t  doubt that plaintiffs' 
attorneys and defendants' insurers 
sometimes act in conflict with the best 
interests of the parties. But we dont 
believe that such conficts (strategic or 
ozhembe) are a common came of trials. 
Taking a casc to nial aga'inst the interests 
of the client violates professional nams, 
and m y  subject the attomy or the 
insurance company to formal or inform$- 
sanctions. No- and sanctions don't n 
e b t e  abuses, but they do suggest that 
the disfavored behavior is the exceptim 
rather than the rule. In this context, our 
survey data are consistent with that 
expectation. The attorneys we interviewed 
frequently said thnt the trial was c a u d  
by the opposition5 stupidity or &%*.p 
stubbornness, but no d e f s e  attorney 
manuhctwrer loses, and mkht ~ m ~ k  said that there was no settlement be&use 
the plnintiFs attomey wanted a shot at a 
Almost nobody said "We gambled and lostw or "We decided to fight, and we woi 
major verdia, and no phimiff s lawyer 
said that it happened because the 
insumce company hid W e  to lisk at 
trial and was wtnconcemecl about its 
insured. 
If we ignore occasiody serious mi 
codicts and assme thnt attorneys and 
insurance companies W e  these cases 
in the best intellests of the parties, then 
thc =peat p h y e ~  in ordinary civil 
litigation are all on the defense. Plain* 
are almost always individuals and 
therefore necessarily one-shot players, 
while defendan@, if hey are not large 
businesses or government entities - and - 
therefm likely to be repeat players in 
their own right - are almost always 
insured, usually completely In orher 
contexts, repeat players may just as easily 
be plaintiffs. This is true of some private 
litigants (e .g., environmental p u p s )  and 
it is the rule for public litigants: the 
Internal Revenue Service, regulatory 
agencies, and, most important, criminal 
prosecutors. If a repeat party is a plaintiff 
it can set its agenda and influence law 
and practice by its filing stratcply . Indeed, 
that is likely to be its main tool, since 
nothing that happens lam is as influential 
as the decision to file in the fmt place - 
especially since most repeat player 
plaintiffs see many more possible caw 
then they can ever handle. 
A repeat player defendant can hope to 
exercise some conml over the general 
pattern of litigation, but only through its 
satlmmt strategy Unlike a repeat player 
plaintiff, it it no other way to send 
signals or channel cases. The only 
ultimate threat it can make is .the threat of 
tnal, and it must take some cases to trial 
to keep that threat credhle. Therefore we 
would expect the defendants in these 
ordinary civil cases to be more likely than 
the plainti& to engage in strategic 
bargaining, and more prone to take cases 
to trial for strategc reasons. Our S I X ~ V ~  
data support this prediction. Although 
while insured civil defendants (who sethe 
and pay up on most cl8nr) win 
approximately 70% of personal injury 
trials. 
Our settlement dau show clear signs 
of strategic bargaining by defendants that - 
is aimed at goals beyond the outemes df 
the trials at hand. Many of these cases- 
went to trial without any meanin&d pre- 
trial negotiations because the ckfednts 
made no settlement offers whatever. 
These zero-o&r cases make up wer a 
quarter of all trids, and about 60% of 
medical malpractice trials. A zero offer is 
never a reasonable assessment a f  the 
expected cost of a mse to a de$mdanit. 
The trial itself is never fm and u s w b  
expensive, and there is always a chance; 
however low, that a jury will side with 
the plaintiff. Rut unlike the low-ball 
strategy that defendants seem to use in 
commercial casts, m a h  zero offers is 
not a promising way to avoid trials. If no 
may also occur becaw the parties have 
m m - e e  ~~~YEZ%S&I o m  
judgments Sewrid ~~ have 
~ d t h e i m p 0 ~ 0 f ~  
partimla~ m~-moTnSc motive: the 
desire to have a day im CQUT~, to o h i h  
f ~ d  jtl~tb?. They Ah  k t  
1itqpmt.s wmt a type of sgltisktim that 
settlement ram137 ~~ - public 
vindacatiion-dthepagiiithnt . 
vindbtion is a goal that our legat +em 
should promme. 
Qur interviews wih attorneys in tk 
1990-91 uials provide some h t s  on rhe 
m e  of nmeconomk ataks in civil -Is. 
Forthe most pan, our hdqp  are ,- 
negative. In ?35'~erviewP, only. three 
attorneys mentioned n desin far 
rdndiation a~ an ed~p-on far why 
their casr went to vinL Two ~ t l ~ v  said 
their cr;tcie was +tried because a party 
b & d  her day in colln;,they we= on 
the opposing sides af the snme case, &id 
each pointed his hgea at the otherb. 
client. Only a 6w* attributed triJs even in 
part ta the &re of a dip-nt for a hesling 
or P public judgment. Nor did any aher 
nonecorn& mati= m&ee as a 
common explanation for tlmc uiels. 
:' Most physician malpractice imurmce 
policies sold in Womb comain a 
The "consent to settle" clause which requires 
' the atgreement of the doctor to any non- 
zm,settlement negotiated by the insurer. 
, " clients' (and their own) economic Lack of consent is mentioned by an 
$&em& in the litigation. Some attorneys - attomqr as a cause of trial in 19 of the 32 
,&nay have becone sd acculturated to the 1990-91 zero-offer medical malpractice 
trials, and we suspect that it was a factor 
in at least several other mehcal 
they malpractice trials in whch no attorney 
specifically mentioned it. We also h o w  
that the trial rate in medical malpractice 
cases is considerably higher across the 
driving their eases to trial. - nation than for any other category of 
; . personal injury litigation, and that 
I . . , ' doctors win defense verdicts in more than 
ommon litigation in Caifomia ., ' 90% of the cases in whch there is no 
don't care much about having their; .settlement offer at any point in the 
m court. Despite what some rhokrs : : litigation. What explains these patterns? 
What seems to be happening is that 
doctors are insisting on tnal in some 
,G an L- medical malpractice cases in whch they 
advantage. FMllf it may be- +I .- expect to obtain public vindication. T ~ E  
plaintiffs and defehbts ; -L,-,+ is most hkely to happen when the doctor 
prefer vth&cation at uial to private$.- 'is convinced that she acted in a 
prof&ssionally responsible manner, but 
has nonetheless been wounded in her self 
esteem and damaged in her reputation by 
and the plaintiff k attorney , - .  - a patienth claim that she committed 
ntrol the settlement de&i~n. + ,;->:. malpractice. Cases where the defendant 
mdt, few ofthe case$ that Ldc go:;- :'!: feels like that all the way up to trial are 
-F;ilikely to be winners for the defense. In 
other contacts, insurance companies 
settle most odds-on winners for 
- < 
for vindication was indeed at Ithe ,,comparatively small amounts, in order to 
f many trials -- ar least in one type .-i, save trial costs and to minimize risks. 
. As we've seen. 27% of these me~-, Not here. Unlike other litigants, doctors 
not settle because defendan& offered --I; have negotiated insurance contracts that 
hing to the phix~frif, at any pint in - .I: give them the power to make that choice 
preoial proceeding. This "zmoffef - .$ themselves. Moreover, since the insurance 
ried across types of daims. from a ; i-' cornpimy remains responsible for the 
1 1 % m 1 5 % i a v e ~ c ~  . 
g e m  trials, to a hign of 59% to 46% - :; 
maIprwrice trials. We believe-. : : 
te of zm-offers in medical . 
defense costs and for damage awards at 
trial, the defendant doctor can usually 
reject a low settlement without 
undertaking personal hbility for legal 
costs or for any judgment w i h  policy 
limits. The usual result is a trial that the 
insurance company pays for, and the 
doctor wins. In other words, at least in 
one type of litigation where reputation 
and vindication are particularly 
sigruficant for a coherent constituency of 
defendants, those defendants have been 
able to order their private relationshps 
with their insurance companies in a way 
that protects that interest. 
A s  we noted at the outset, a major - 
and successful - goal of lawyers, judges 
and rule makers is to promote 
settlements. We do not advocate an 
attempt to further reduce the extremely 
low trial rate in our civil courts, but if a 
further reduction is sought, our research 
suggests that some methods are more 
likely to succeed than others. 
The techniques of encouragmg 
settlement can be roughly divided 
between two approaches. The first set of 
techniques rely on infomation. They 
attempt to aclueve settlement by 
providing unbiased information to t 
parties about the dispute. The second 
of techniques rely on incentives. They 
encourage parties to settle by increasin 
the risks or reducing the rewards of 
tored. If you fail to settle: 
A 
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must drop out entirely or pay a lot to gamble at high stakes. 
on the   as is of the best information they 
have been able to obtain. By changing the 
structure of costs and rewards it is 
possible to change the odds of favorable 
outcomes for one side or the other, or for 
both, across whole categories of cases. 
The result might be an overall change in 
the pattern of civil litigation, including, 
perhaps, a reduction in the number 
of trials. 
Or perhaps not. For example, consider 
the effects of eliminating contingent fees 
altogether - an extreme proposal, and, 
in our opinion, an extremely bad idea. If 
that happened the number of civil law 
suits would be reduced drastically, at least 
in the short run; and the distribution of 
cases that were filed would change 
dramatically (e.g., a higher proportion of 
the remaining filings would be in 
commercial cases); new institutions 
would be created to cope with the new 
needs generated by the system (e.g., new 
systems for paylng legal fees, including 
perhaps new forms of insurance); the 
pattern of settlements and trial outcomes 
would change in unforeseeable ways; and 
the number of trials might go down. But it 
also might not. It could turn out that we 
would still need as many trials as we now 
have, or more to define the contours of 
the new system. 
Procedures that affect the risks of trial 
also have the opposite effect. The 
of large jury verdicts on the one 
, and of defense verdicts on the 
, weigh heavily in favor of 
ement . Ancient procedural devices 
as remittitur and additur, and newer 
such as damage caps and limitations 
a punitive damages, should (if anything) 
increase the percentage of filed cases that possible outcomes at trial could help 
proceed to trial. In addition, or instead, answer that demand by making trial less 
the parties to a lawsuit may agree scary, whch might encourage more 
privately to restrict the risk of extreme parties to take their chances and try it. 
outcomes at trial. A strilung example is a , . , pik,,;:,~&,::' gw> ~ r s  
technique known as the "hgh-low .* t:Jk?~7 ..> 
agreement." .-- -+-conclusion - * ,  ~ $ 4  
A "high-low agreement" is a partial 2 
settlement in which the plaintiff and the 
- 
The essence of adversarial litigation is 
defendant each insure the other against procedure. We define justice in 
an extreme verdict. The plaintiff agrees to procedural terms: the judgment of a 
collect no more than a maximum amount competent court following a trial that was 
specified in the agreement, regardless of a procedurally correct. When we want to 
hgher jury verdict, while the defendant improve our judcial system we pass a 
agrees to pay no less than a minimum procedural reform, which invariably 
amount specified in the agreement, means elabomting ofd procedural rules or 
regardless of a lower jury verdict. High- adding new ones - rules that govern the 
low agreements have been reported since presentation of evidence and arguments, 
at least 1968. They are usually reached rules that create opportunities to 
shortly before or during trial, padcularly investigate and to prepare evidence and 
in penonal injury cases involving large argument, and rules that are designed to 
potential damages and uncertain liability; regulate the use of the procedures that are 
they are legal and enforceable. available to investigate, prepare and 
High-low agreements permit private present evidence and argument. The 
parties to limit the scope of a juryb fact- upshot is a -terpiece of detail, with 
finding on damages in ways that go rules on everydung from specid 
beyond those permitted by the rules of appearances to contest the jurisdiction of 
evidence and summary judgment. Under the court to the use of &bits during 
this procedure, trial outcomes are jury deliberation. But we can't afford it. 
~ ~ ~ ~ e d  by the settkment negotiations As litigants, few of us can pay the costs of 
that preceded them: the agreement to trial; as a society, we are unwilling to pay 
participate in this constrained trial is the even a fraction of the cost of the judicial 
last step of an incomplete compromise. apparatus that we would need to try most 
The availability of this option (if the civll cases. We have designed a 
parties are aware of it) will tend to spectacular system for adjudicating 
discourage full settlements and to disputes, but itS too expensive to use. 
facilitate trials. It's no secret that our We respond to this dilemma on two 
system of civil justice has generated a levels, private and public. The private 
pent-up demand for low cost litigation. As mpome is to create instimtiom that 
a result, a procedure that lowers the cost enable parties to aggregate the costs, 
of litigation -for example, a small-claims and benefits of litigation across many 
court - will increase the volume of cases: liability insurance for defendants, 
litigation and the number of trials (albeit to pay for legal fees as well as damages, 
cheaper, quicker trials). The development and contingency fees for plaintiffs. These 
of the high-low agreement demonstrates structures make it p=ible for to 
the existence of a parallel demand for low prepare for t ~ l ,  and to retain trial as an 
risk adjudication. Any techruque, public 
or private, that reduces the range of 
main function of trials is not to resolve disputes but to deter other trials. 4 
option. The public response is to actively 
discourage trials. We provide some 
positive assistance in reaching 
compromises, but the main push is 
negative: Litigants learn to avoid trial in 
order to reduce their risks and save their 
money Formal litigation is presented not 
as an adjunct but as an alternative to 
private settlement; not as an aid but as 
a threat. 
The main function of trials is not to 
resolve disputes but to deter other trials. 
And they do, very effectively One 
consequence is that those few cases that 
do go to jury trial - perhaps 2% of civil 
filings, and less than 1 % of all civil 
claims - are very different from the mass 
of cases that settle. They are typically 
high-risk, all or n o t h g  cases, cases with 
unusual facts or intransigent parties, cases 
that defy compromise. Their outcomes, 
by comparison with ordinary work-a-day 
settlement cases, are costly, unpredictable, 
and sometimes bizarre. Since jury trials 
and jury verdicts are the most visible 
products of litigation, these extreme and 
unrepresentative cases distort public 
perception of the administration of civil 
justice. In the process, they perpetuate 
the image of litigation as terror, which 
helps drive all but the most hopeless 
disputes out of court, whch means that 
any general policy based on what 
happens in those cases that are tried d l  
be misconceived. 
In 192 1 Learned Hand wrote that "as a 
litigant I should dread a law suit beyond 
almost anything else short of sickness and 
death" - a widely repeated and 
deceptively simple sentence. Judge Hand's 
statement was not intended as a report of 
an idiosyncratic aversion, but as a 
judgment by one who ought to know 
that litigation is dreadful. Lesser judges 
and mere lawyers mostly agree, including 
us. Our research adds evidence to 
support one part of this widely shared 
belief: those lawsuits that are fought to 
the end are indeed risky, costly, and 
unpredictable. 
Hand's main message, of course, is not 
a description, but an injunction: Don't 
litigate. It is a concise expression of the 
repeated advice of generations of 
conscientious lawyers: Anticipate 
problems and avoid conflicts; if conflicts 
arise, resolve them privately; if at all 
possible, don't sue. And when lawsuits 
are filed, ths  advice is transformed into 
the mantra of the judge: Settle. Every day 
in countless settlement conferences trial 
judges sell their own versions of Learned 
Hand's wisdom: "They're offering you 
$70,000. A jury could give you 
$150,000, but I've seen folks just like you 
come up empty, lots of times. If it were 
me, I'd be scared; I'd take it." More often 
yet, this lecture is delivered by lawyers 
long before any judge enters the picture. 
There is another injunction that could 
be embedded in Judge Handk aphorism: 
Our system of justice is terrible, and we 
must change it. But we don't understand 
him that way anymore than we interpret 
him to mean that a dispute is an injury 
and a lawsuit the process by which it is 
healed. We not only accept as a fact that 
it is the lawsuit that is the disease, we 
seem to relish it. If trial were a safe, soft, 
reassuring process, many more disputants 
would seek trial and the courts would be 
overwhelmed; they're struggling as it is at 
a 2% trial rate. But there's no cause for 
concern. The major elements of the 
system - adversarial factfinding, trial by 
jury, contingent fees, liability insurance 
- all fit together to make trial the 
dangerous event we need to drive nearly - 
everyone to settle. 
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